In the previous article a series of questions were posited with respect to North Korea’s intentions and goals.  Questions come before answers, or at least they should.  Upon  setting forth the fundamental questions the next step in the process is to establish a framework or construct that would enable one to interpret if not establish with certitude the political goals of the actor in question, in this case a nation-state. Upon reflection, this author has decided to recur to a terminology and methodology from a half-century ago, or so.. The term is brinkmanship, also occasionally spelled brinksmanship, and was apparently coined by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to describe a strategic approach to statecraft, manifested in particular incidents, during the Cold War with the USSR, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Brinkmanship may be a variation on the word gamesmanship and could be defined as going to the limit without actually going to war, done deliberately so as obtain a particular advantage, concession or outcome.  The goal is to make the opponent back off or back down especially by creating the impression that one is willing to, or is actually going to resort to even more extreme actions, including war. Escalation is a part of this as well.  A state that uses brinkmanship will often create a crisis.  Does this describe the North Korean approach to international relations?  If it does, have they been successful?  Is it possible to know if a state intended to go to war?  What would be the consequence of one side always backing down?

Has North Korea in the latest crisis acted in a manner consistent with its past approach to international relations, both penninsular and transatlantic?  Is war a real possibility, from their perspective?  Why would the leadership desire another war?  Or are they testing the limits of South Korean and US patience and/or political will?